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ABSTRACT. Commercial wetlands are defined as wetlands directed by an entrepreneur with the intention
of making a profit. The combination of ecosystem services that commercial wetlands can provide seems
to be an attractive societal perspective. Nevertheless, these wetlands are not developed on a large scale in
the Netherlands. This paper discusses different types of economic governance that could facilitate the
development of new commercial wetlands and addresses challenges that have to be overcome. We conclude
that developing governance solutions that address ecosystem services with different scales is crucial for
the introduction of commercial wetlands. Also, distinct and autonomous property rights of entrepreneurs
need to be addressed.
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INTRODUCTION
Europe, and in particular the Netherlands, has to
cope with numerous problems in its water
management because of climate change, soil
subsidence, and surface water pollution (de Jonge
2009). Droughts and floods are examples of these
problems. The Dutch government expects that
waterlogging problems in rural areas will increase
(Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water
Management 2007). Rural areas are able to offer
local and regional solutions in which water and land
management can be adapted to reduce the
aforementioned problems and also decrease nitrate
and phosphate emissions to water bodies. In this
paper, we examine the introduction of commercial
wetlands as a form of multifunctional land use.
These are defined as wetlands directed on a
voluntary basis by an entrepreneur with the
intention of making a profit and an extra opportunity
to earn an income. The benefits of commercial
wetlands are defined as ecosystem services
(Millennium Ecosystem Assessment 2005).
Commercial wetlands produce various ecosystem
services that are currently not traded on a market,
implying that the entrepreneur will not be
compensated for his efforts. To encourage
entrepreneurs to develop commercial wetlands,
adequate incentives for the provision of wetland
services are needed, including a private income that
can be earned by exploiting a wetland. Kroeger and
Casey (2007) highlight that government payments
may be the most effective incentive for ecosystem
services that the private sector can provide. In
practice, intermediaries are frequently setting the
price for public services, with users often unaware
of the fact that they pay (Vatn 2010). Institutional
aspects of providing adequate incentives are
important for commercial wetlands. We will
analyze how economic governance can align private
investment decisions with a socially optimal
allocation.
The objective of this paper is to identify the
challenges involved when attempting to establish
economic governance to create financial incentives
reflecting the value of commercial ecosystem
services. Economic governance should enable the
development and implementation of Payments for
Ecosystem Services (PES) systems (Vatn 2010).
These systems involve the voluntary transaction
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between an ecosystem service provider and an
ecosystem service buyer. Because wetlands
produce an array of different ecosystem services,
economic, ecological, and institutional perspectives
have to be combined to determine the adequate
economic governance to facilitate the introduction
of commercial wetlands.
Recently, there has been a wide interest in PES
systems. However, little attention has been devoted
to constructing the remuneration of this service on
the economic  value of the  provided  ecosystem
(e.g., Wünscher et al. 2008). As the value of
ecosystem services depends on the demand, the
economic value is not equal among different
landowners, neither does the value depend on the
income position of the landowner. A PES system
paying everyone the same price may be considered
as fair (Ferraro 2008), but it is not guaranteed that
it will result in a socially optimal allocation. A PES
system benefiting the poor (as in Milder et al. 2010)
is not based on the economic value of the ecosystem
services and may not result in a socially optimal
situation either. Because it is from an economic
point of view to base the remuneration for the
provided ecosystem service on the economic value
of the service, our study contributes to governing
the internalization of externalities in the PES
systems.
To construct a socially optimum PES system, we
develop an Economic Ecosystem governance
framework (summarized as Eco² governance
framework) to provide a systematic guide through
the relevant steps and information necessary for an
entrepreneur to decide whether to invest in wetlands
or not. This framework also shows the challenges
for expansion of commercial wetlands. The
framework allows us to analyze scaling issues for
economic governance of wetlands if various
services are provided simultaneously. Scale is
defined as “the spatial, temporal, quantitative, or
analytical dimensions used to measure and study
any phenomenon” (Gibson et al. 2000:218).
The paper is organized as follows. First, the Eco²
governance framework that focuses on integrating
wetland services in economic decision making is
introduced, together with the relevant scales and
levels. We apply the distinctive steps and scales in
this framework to analyze challenges for expanding
commercial wetlands, after which, conclusions are
drawn.
FRAMEWORK FOR INTEGRATING
ECOSYSTEM SERVICES IN DECISION
MAKING ON INVESTING IN
COMMERCIAL WETLANDS
To utilize commercial wetlands for solving social
problems it is necessary to understand the provided
ecosystem services, the value of these services, and
the governance mechanism, i.e., economic
governance structures, relevant for incorporating
ecosystem services in private land use decisions.
For this purpose we develop the Eco² governance
framework that enables the identification of
challenges for the implementation of economic
governance structures.
Economic ecological governance framework
The Eco² governance framework is developed to
analyze, and optimize from a social perspective,
decision making about investing in commercial
wetlands (Fig. 1). This figure is adapted from
Reinhard et al. (2004) and Daily et al. (2009).
Reinhard et al. (2004) constructed a framework
based on DPSIR (Driving Forces-Pressures-State-
Impacts-Responses), developed by the European
Environmental Agency, to analyze the impact of
various potential measures on the value of water.
Further, they made use of programming cycles
evaluation studies in which strategies, goals, inputs,
activities, outputs, and expected effects are related
(EC 1999). Daily et al. (2009) use a comparable
framework to show how ecosystem services can be
integrated into decision making. In this paper, we
add the scaling perspective with a focus on the
consequences for economic governance.
The Eco² governance framework links the decision
to invest in ecosystems (step 1) to the physical
impact on the ecosystem (step 2). One of the
distinguishing characteristics of commercial
ecosystems is that it is the entrepreneur’s voluntary
decision to invest in ecosystems. In step 3, this
impact is translated into an effect on the provision
of ecosystem services in physical terms. In step 4,
the value of the change in these services is
computed. In the next step (5), governance
mechanisms at different jurisdictional levels can
internalize ecosystem service values. Governments
can offer entrepreneurs remuneration schemes that
are based on social values that give incentives to
entrepreneurs to invest in commercial wetlands
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Fig. 1. Economic Ecosystem governance framework to analyze decision making about ecosystem
services
(step 1). We will limit our discussion to one cycle
of the framework to avoid an overly complex
presentation and apply the framework to a case
study. However, our approach is an iterative process
that allows for feedback loops based on the
information in the previous loop.
Step 1, the decision to invest, to develop a
commercial wetland, is based on the expected effect
of this decision. If an entrepreneur considers
investing in a commercial wetland, the sum of the
expected revenues should be larger than the
investment costs. Of course, we could also consider
other objectives of the entrepreneur (see Jongeneel
et al. 2008), but for the commercial exploitation, the
ratio of revenues and costs is important.
In this paper, we use information from a pilot project
in the neighborhood of Haaksbergen, in the eastern
part of the Netherlands (Fig. 2). Within this project,
a parcel of 3 ha of green maize has been transformed
into a wetland called “Waterpark Het Lankheet.” It
is a pilot project to analyze the contribution of this
type of wetland to the goals of the EU Water
Framework Directive (WFD). This wetland was
financed with a special governmental project
subsidy. Here, we analyze the potential to expand
this project country-wide on a commercial basis.
In step 2, if the entrepreneur invests in a commercial
wetland, land such as agricultural land will be
transformed into a multifunctional wetland. The
socially optimal area of commercial wetlands will
depend on the social demand for these wetlands.
The social demand is investigated in step 3, the
provision of ecosystem services.
In Waterpark Het Lankheet, 3 ha of arable land was
inundated and planted with reeds. The agricultural
production was substituted for wetland’s ecosystem
services. The following services are taken into
account:
 
l
 Water treatment in terms of nutrient
concentration reduction with helophyte-
filters;
 
l
 Biomass production (to produce renewable
energy);
 
l
 Capturing carbon;
 
l
 Solving desiccation problems in nature
conservation areas;
 
l
 Water storage to avoid flooding;
 
l
 Recreation such as walking, cycling,
picnicking, jogging, playing etc.
 In step 3, the ecosystem services provided by
agriculture will be reduced and the services
delivered by wetlands are increased. The magnitude
of this change in functions can be computed with
production functions. The ecosystem services
provided depend on the location, e.g., the altitude
and the proximity of water, and on the number of
citizens that benefit from the commercial wetland.
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Fig. 2. Spatial ecosystem service scale and spatial beneficiaries scale per commercial wetland function.
The ecosystem services have to be quantified to
enable financial incentives related to these services
(Engel et al. 2008).
The biophysical performance of Waterpark Het
Lankheet is summarized in Table 1. From the
research carried out at the Lankheet pilot project, it
is known that depending on the residence time and
volume per unit area, reed is capable of reducing
the total amount of nitrogen in the water with
average efficiencies from 32% to 47% and the total
amount of phosphorous from 27% to 45%
(Meerburg et al. 2010). This makes a biophysical
performance of the water purification of 500 kg N
and 50 kg P per ha per year realistic. Biomass
production varies from year to year, but an amount
of 30 ton dry matter per ha is a reliable expectation
(Duke 1983, Chiu and Wong 2006, Meerburg et al.
2010). The amount of C captured by reed depends
on the yield. Giving the chemical composition of
reed, 1 ton of dry matter biomass consists of 400 kg
C. This implies that 1 ha of reed producing 30 ton
dry mater captures 12 ton C. The service of peek
water logging depends on the height of the dikes
around the wetland. If 70 cm of extra water can be
logged on the wetland, the service consists of 7000
m³ per ha.
Step 4 determines who benefits from the different
ecosystems services at different spatial scales, and
examines the value beneficiaries attached to
different ecosystem services. The economic value
element reflects the importance of the ecosystem
services for the beneficiaries (Hein et al. 2006). We
are aware of other important values, such as cultural
and philosophical, or spiritual values, however in
this paper we focus on monetary values because they
are essential to enable a value-based incentive. The
economic value depends on the preferences for
ecosystem services of the beneficiaries who are
affected by the decision to invest in commercial
ecosystems. Beneficiaries can attribute four value
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Table 1. Scale value and governance issues attached to the implementation of commercial wetlands.
Ecosystem Service Economic Value Economic Governance
Wetland
service
Scale 3:
Spatial ecosystem
service scale
Biophysical
performance
Scale 4:
Spatial
beneficiaries scale
(number of
households)
Economic value
per beneficiary
(household)
Scale 5:
Jurisdictional scale
Water purification Downstream 500 kg N per ha
50 kg P per ha
3640 € 6.17 Water board: Insufficient
water quality in a water
body
Water logging Downstream 7000 m3 water
per ha
128675 € 6.38 Water board: Flood and
high water risk
Improving
ecosystem quality
Wetland Improved
ecosystem
quality
21165 € 4.51 Provinces: Desiccation
problems
Capturing CO2
emissions
Global 12 ton C per ha. ∞ € 3.71
Biomass
production
At the spot 30 ton dry
matter per ha
1* € 0.00 Private actors
Recreation
options
At the spot 8655 € 2.55 Private actors
Municipality
Provinces
* The wetland entrepreneur
types to ecosystem services, namely: direct use
values, indirect use values, option values, and
nonuse values. Valuation methods have to be used
to identify the value of the ecosystem services per
beneficiary and the number of beneficiaries (Brown
et al. 2007).
For Waterpark Het Lankheet, different wetland
services are distinguished (see step 2 and 3). The
economic value per beneficiary (household)
depends on individual preferences for and use of the
increased provision of wetland services. Because
most of the provided wetland services are public
good services, no market price exists. Biomass
production is an exception. This could be seen as a
private product that if traded, could have a market
price. However, currently the market price for
biomass-reed is negligible.
To calculate the total economic value of the public
wetland services, a monetary valuation method is
used to calculate the economic value per household
expressed in willingness to pay (WTP). Households
were asked their WTP to realize extra commercial
wetlands in the Netherlands using the contingent
valuation method (CVM). CVM is a survey-based
valuation technique used for wetland valuation in
economic literature (see, for instance, Barbier et al.
1997, Birol et al. 2006). The ecosystem services
derived from commercial wetland are highly
correlated, which makes it difficult to distinguish
between individual services (Brouwer et al. 1999).
To avoid double counting and because valuing the
wetland services separately through individual
CVM exercises could lead to seriously biased
estimations, we applied the Analytical Hierarchical
Process (AHP) to decompose the CVM value (see
Kallas et al. 2007).
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The data was received from an internet
questionnaire and collected in December 2008. The
respondents were members of a panel of a
specialized bureau (TNS-NIPO) and many
socioeconomic characteristics were already known.
The average time spent on filling out the valuation
questionnaire could therefore be kept relatively
short and respondents were remunerated for filling
out complete questionnaires. Before the questionnaire
was put online, it was pretested with a selected
number of respondents. The sample of 826
respondents was representative of the Dutch
population. The total economic value per household
to realize exploitation of commercial wetlands to
get better water quality, more water storage options
to solve flooding, to solve desiccation problems,
capture CO2 emissions via an increase in biomass
production, and increase recreation options in the
Netherlands is 23 euros per household. As shown
in Table 1, the sum of the separated values add up
to 23 euros. It appears that Dutch households have
the highest WTP for the water purification and for
the water logging services.
Step 5 presents the governance mechanisms in
which the ecosystem services are embedded. The
actual provision of ecosystem services depends
largely on these institutions because they influence
the decision making in step 1. A socially optimal
institutional structure relates the societal demand
for ecosystems services to the supply. It takes the
social value of the ecosystem services into account
to attain a socially optimal result. For most
ecosystem processes, because of high transactions
costs, the difficulty in attaching values to ecosystem
services, and the nonexcludable character of the
ecosystem services, no traditional market exists
where price is the only coordination tool (Boyd and
Banshee 2007, Brown et al. 2007, Kroeger and
Casey 2007). To stimulate sustainable supply of
commercial ecosystems next to markets of
ecosystem products, other governance mechanisms,
i.e., institutions, are necessary to provide the social
demand of ecosystem services.
Waterpark Het Lankheet received subsidies because
it acted as a pilot study to analyze the potential of
this kind of measure to attain the water quality
demanded by the WFD. These subsidies are not
available for landowners who want to copy the
waterpark concept on their own grounds. Wetlands
are regarded as a more attractive measure than
technical Wordlessness, because they are a
voluntarily measure and they produce other
ecosystem services simultaneously. They currently
lack financial incentives for landowners. This
means that commercial wetland entrepreneurs are
not paid for the provision of the public ecosystem
services and their contribution to different policy
goals.
Integrating scaling into the Eco² governance
framework
In this section, we show that including the relevant
scales into the Eco² governance framework will
provide additional information for the alignment of
the economic governance, i.e., institutions, to
stimulate and facilitate commercial wetlands. As
Cash et al. (2006:8) argue, “most attention given to
scale in studies of human-environment interactions
has focused on spatial, temporal, and jurisdictional
issues, there are other scales that may be worth
considering in particular cases.”
In their article, they also elaborate on the
institutional, management, network, and knowledge
scales. Different levels are distinguished on all these
scales. We build on Cash et al. (2006) by defining
the relevant scale for each step in the Eco²
governance framework (Fig. 3).
We first describe the appropriate levels of the
different elements of the Eco² governance
framework, and illustrate each step with
information on the actual commercial wetland
Waterpark Het Lankheet.
Scale 1, the institutional scale, is regarded as a
separate scale (Cash et al. 2006). Institutional
arrangements, for example, not only have specific
jurisdictional characteristics but also fall into a
hierarchy of rules, ranging from basic operating
rules and norms through to systems of rules for
making constitutions (Ostrom et al. 1999). Under a
low level on the institutional scale, stakeholders
have to make specific institutional arrangements.
Opening a decision making process involves
transaction costs. The decision making system
relevant for commercial wetlands first involves the
private land owner(s). In cases of collective decision
making where several owners are involved, the
system becomes more complex.
The scale of step 2, 3, and 4 is predominantly the
spatial scale. However, these scales are based on
different sets of indicators. Therefore, we attach
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Fig. 3. Scales connected to the Eco2 governance framework
three different spatial scales to these steps. Scale 2
indicates the scale of the commercial wetland itself
and is expressed in hectares. Scale 3 measures the
impact of the commercial wetland, i.e., the effect of
the ecosystem services. The unit of measurement
depends on the specific service. Scale 4 includes the
beneficiaries of the ecosystem services and is
expressed in the number of households affected by
the wetland’s ecosystem services. We will describe
these spatial scales in more detail. Step 5 is related
to the jurisdictional scale (as in Cash et al. 2006).
Scale 2, the spatial wetland scale is defined as the
size of the commercial wetland. The unit of analysis
of this scale is hectare land use. The size is
determined by the wetland ecosystem boundaries,
selected by the land owner. The distribution of
property rights and the attractiveness of wetland as
a commercial land use affect the actual size of the
wetland.
Scale 3, the spatial ecosystem service scale, is
defined by the scale of the different ecosystem
services provided by the wetland. The ecosystem
services provided by a commercial wetland are
based on different biophysical processes. The
amount of water treatment depends for instance on
the water quality entering the Waterpark (in kg
phosphorus), the water flow (in m³) etc. The amount
of carbon captured in the reed is a function of the
reed yield. Models developed for these physical
processes are useful to predict the delivery of
ecosystem services (e.g., Tall is and Pol a sky 2009).
The spatial ecosystem service scale quantifies and
spatially maps the provision of ecosystem services.
The levels of the spatial ecosystem scale can be local
(desiccation reduction and recreation), downstream
(water storage and water treatment), and worldwide
(capturing carbon). In Table 1, we schematically
mapped the spatial ecosystem service scale of the 6
distinguished ecosystem services.
Scale 4, the spatial beneficiary scale, gives the
number of households who benefit from the
ecosystem services, and the spatial location of their
residences. By investigating the demand for these
services, the economic benefit per beneficiary per
ecosystem service can be linked to specific
beneficiaries. Beneficiaries at different spatial-
economic impact levels can attach different values
to ecosystem services (Hein et al. 2006). The unit
of analysis of the spatial-economic impact scale is
the total value per service which depends on the
number of beneficiaries and on the value per
beneficiary of the changed ecosystem service
provision (Hanley et al. 2003, Bateman et al. 2006,
Villa et al. 2009).
The number of households that benefit from a
specific ecosystem service depends on the location
with respect to the wetland and the impact of the
changed ecosystem service (see scale 3). To
determine the impact of this scale, we analyzed the
beneficiaries per spatial ecosystem scale (scale 3).
For a realistic illustration, we used studies
estimating distance decay functions for the value of
ecosystem services, and expert knowledge
(Bateman et al. 2006, Hime et al. 2009, Villa et al.
2009). The beneficiaries of water purification are
assumed to be the farmers downstream, less than
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500 m from the river. The beneficiaries of water
storage are assumed to be the inhabitants of the area
downstream, up to 5 km on both sides of the river.
The living location of beneficiaries of the solution
to desiccation problems is within the 10 km radius
of the commercial wetland. The beneficiaries of
improved recreation options live within 5 km of the
commercial wetland. The benefits of CO2 reduction
are global. Based on these assumptions, the
beneficiaries of Waterpark Het Lankheet are given
in Figure 2. In Table 1, the number of beneficiaries
is quantified by the number of households living at
a location where the specific commercial ecosystem
service is provided by Waterpark Het Lankheet. We
estimated this number with data from Statistics
Netherlands.
Scale 5, the jurisdictional scale, is defined as clearly
bounded and organized political units, with linkages
between them created by constitutional and
statutory means (Cash et al. 2006). Inclusion of this
scale is necessary to investigate whether an
organizational infrastructure is available to realize
ecosystem service objectives. For provision of some
ecosystem services, organizational infrastructure is
developed by making clearly bounded and
organized political units responsible for realizing
objectives. These clearly bounded units, e.g.,
provinces, nations, etc., are the levels of the
jurisdictional scale (Cash et al. 2006). None of these
levels are responsible for the entire array of
ecosystem services provided by Waterpark Het
Lankheet as a whole.
For some of the ecosystem services provided by
commercial wetlands, jurisdictional scales are
available in the Netherlands. Provinces have
jurisdiction over nature zoning policies whereas
water boards are responsible for water related
issues. For the ecosystem services ‘reduced CO2
emissions’ and ‘improving recreation options’, no
single governmental organization has jurisdiction.
The jurisdictional levels for the distinguished
ecosystem services provided by Waterpark Het
Lankheet are summarized in Table 1. The benefits
of commercial wetlands are governed by different
jurisdiction levels.
ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE TO DELIVER
COMMERCIAL ECOSYSTEM SERVICES
In the previous section, the spatial ecosystem
service, spatial beneficiary, and jurisdictional scales
and levels relevant for governing the expansion of
commercial wetlands are quantified and spatially
mapped. To facilitate provision of ecosystem
services through commercial wetlands, economic
governance is necessary. Economic governance
consists of the processes that support economic
activity.
Governance of commercial wetlands
As discussed, commercial wetlands have multiple
scales that go further than selling or buying biomass
only. Wetlands are location specific because they
are not only linked with the local physical
environment but also with the skills of the
entrepreneur and with the local population and its
preferences for public goods. The public good
characteristics of commercial wetlands require
coordination of decision making. The economic
governance in which supply and demand of
different wetland services are coordinated can be
seen as a form of hybrid governance structures.
Hybrid governance structures (see Ménard 2004)
maintain distinct and autonomous property rights of
wetland owners and their associated decision rights.
Coordination within hybrid governance goes far
beyond what the price system can provide and thus
makes them distinct from pure market arrangements
(see for instance Ménard 2004). Taking into account
the specificities of public goods elements of the
ecosystem services provided by commercial
wetlands, hybrid arrangements for these services
can be regrouped according to the following
categories (see also Van Huylenbroeck et al. 2009):
 
1. Information devices: a coordination center
exists that provides information to coordinate
the actions of the individual wetland
entrepreneurs and individual beneficiaries of
the ecosystem service provided. Achieving
higher overall performance compared with
uncoordinated actions of each wetland owner
separately. This option does not affect
jurisdictional scales.
 
2. Contractual arrangements: a coordination
center exists that makes individual contracts
with the entrepreneur who can render the
different ecosystem services to society. This
coordination center is a public body on behalf
of beneficiaries. This body receives from the
public authority the regulatory and incentive
power and instruments, mostly on a
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contractual basis, to regulate, coordinate, and
monitor wetland entrepreneurs. In this case,
the jurisdictional scale has been changed.
 
3. Exogenous regulator or monitor: public
authorities use an external, private or public-
private, body as an intermediate body to
coordinate the actions of individual
entrepreneurs across different wetland
services. Here the jurisdictional scale is not
changed; however, structure is imposed to
coordinate supply and demand of ecosystem
services.
 
4. A governing body: in extreme cases the
governing authority can decide to pass all
legal power to a new public, private, or
public-private body, that receives juridical
and other power. Because of the great shift in
property rights from private entrepreneurs to
the governing body, this goes beyond the
scope of this paper, which focuses on
commercial wetlands.
This list is not complete, but it shows that depending
on the situation at hand, different choices have to
be made with respect to economic governance of
commercial wetlands. The main economic
challenges are addressed to answer the question:
which governance mode is best suited for the
provision of the socially optimal level of the
commercial wetland services by commercial
wetland entrepreneurs?
As illustrated in Table 1, the distinctive scales do
not always match in practice. To include the value
of the commercial wetland functions in investment
decisions, the within- and cross-scales challenges
to deliver the socially optimal level of ecosystem
services are addressed. Within-scale is defined as
interactions among levels inside a single scale, and
cross-scale means interactions across different
scales (see also Cash et al. 2006).
Within-scale challenges
Marginal value challenge 
An advantage of commercial wetlands is that Adam
Smith’s invisible hand will lead to the optimal
provision of commercial wetlands if the marginal
value truly represents the value of the ecosystem
services and inputs. To include the (positive)
external effects of commercial wetlands, the
compensation for the delivered wetland services has
to be determined. This compensation has to be
related to the marginal value. Table 1 presents the
marginal economic values (scale 4) of six ecosystem
services provided by Waterpark Het Lankheet (as
described previously). Direct extrapolations of
marginal values are difficult because extrapolation
from the margin to a higher level should incorporate
knowledge about the shape of the demand curve.
For example, high local values of services such as
water purification may not be maintained if
extrapolated regionally or nationwide. The
marginal value challenge is to determine the
marginal value of commercial ecosystem services
provided, if expanded to higher levels.
Multi jurisdictional challenge 
Within scale 5 (see Table 1), constitutions at
different jurisdictional levels attach property rights
to the different ecosystem services. They specify
land ownership, local governments, states, federal
agencies, and international organizations (see
Lueck 1989 for examples on wildlife laws). Within
institutional economics it is assumed that higher
institutional levels impose constraints on the level
immediately below (see Williamson 2000). Lower
levels give feedback to higher levels. Governance
solutions with a lower level jurisdiction are nested
within larger jurisdiction solutions (see Paavola
2007). Higher level jurisdictions like the European
Union (e.g., Water Framework Directive) or the
Dutch government are “constitutions” for
jurisdictions at lower levels which still have their
own decision making, monitoring, and implementation
bodies and designated conflict resolution processes.
This results in a multijurisdiction demand per
ecosystem services. See in Table 1 for the wetland
service ‘water purification’ example. The EU, the
Dutch government, and the water boards have
policy objectives for water quality. The water
boards are responsible for the water quality in the
Netherlands, creating demand for water purification.
The challenge is to mutually fine-tune policy
agendas and stakeholder interests operating across
different institutional levels.
Cross-scale challenges
Multifunctional land use challenges 
Because of different social and ecological changes,
e.g., population growth, income growth, and climate
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change, a large number of societal claims on scarce
urban land exists (Nijkamp et al. 2003). Commercial
wetlands make efficient use of scarce land by
combining different functions within one area
intently, i.e., multifunctional land use. Governments
at different levels frame problems so that these
become tractable within their jurisdictions (see for
instance Scott 1998, Lebel et al. 2005, as cited in
Cash et al. 2006). Following Cash et al. (2006),
potential mismatch problems result from the fact
that the jurisdictional scale of the management
institution is not coterminous with the problem,
which is measured at the spatial ecosystem service
scale.
A mismatch between the multiple and overlapping
jurisdictions relevant for ecosystem services
provided by commercial wetlands exists. Looking
at the jurisdictional scale (scale 5), provincial
authorities are responsible for realization at the
spatial ecosystem service scale (scale 3) of
recreation and improving ecosystem quality; the
nature and landscape aspects of wetlands. They do
not have comparable jurisdiction over both water
quality and water quantity related issues. The
provinces and linked zoning policies related to
nature and landscape are mainly nested within the
Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality
and the Ministry of Economic Affairs. Water related
policies are mainly the responsibility of the Ministry
of Transport, Public Works and Water
Management. In the Netherlands, all kinds of
institutional arrangements are present to align
different policy objectives originating from
jurisdictions. The responsible jurisdictional levels
for commercial wetlands can be considered as task-
specific jurisdictions instead of general purpose
jurisdictions (see Hooghe and Marks 2003). This
implies that some element of coordination will be
required across policy regimes (Hodge 2007). The
multifunctional land use challenge is to obtain the
required level of coordination between the
responsible jurisdictional levels.
Economic benefit challenge
Governance needed for the implementation of PES
payment schemes for the provision of commercial
wetland services should, from an economic point of
view, be based on the monetary value of these
services (scale 4). These values are spatially
distributed and do not entirely fit within the
jurisdiction boundaries, so the spatial beneficiary
scale and the jurisdictional scale do not match.
In economic theory, the responsible jurisdictional
level is known as the political jurisdiction (scale 5),
while the beneficiaries live within the economic
jurisdiction (scale 4). The spatial beneficiary scale
(the economic jurisdiction) does not coincide with
those that are able to give incentives to
entrepreneurs to develop commercial wetlands
(political jurisdiction). Bateman et al. (2006)
showed that the political and the economic
jurisdictions in most cases do not match. To include
the sum value of the ecosystem services in the PES
system, a related challenge is that the value is not
equally distributed over the beneficiaries. The
values are expected to reduce with increasing
distance from the commercial ecosystem. The
challenge is to decide which political jurisdiction is
able to transfer the value of the beneficiaries best.
The more ecosystem services are provided
simultaneously, the more difficult to get a payment
for ecosystem services based on the social value of
the exchanging ecosystem services. One reason for
this is the separated responsibility of the ecosystem
services over different jurisdictional levels (scale
5), making the transaction costs relatively high
compared with the value per service (scale 4). The
challenge is to construct a PES system for a wetland
providing many different ecosystem services,
taking into account the social value of the different
services.
Negotiation challenge 
A single beneficiary approach that ignores the
multitude of connections among the wetland
services of commercial ecosystems will fail to
provide a high value for society. The complete
bundle of services the wetland can produce will
generate more welfare for society (see Tallis and
Polaski 2009 for sector approaches). To translate
the value of the ecosystem services in adequate PES
schemes, negotiation is needed (see also de Groot
and Hermans 2009). To do this, different types of
negotiations can be distinguished, namely, political
negotiations within the jurisdictional level
responsible for one commercial ecosystem service,
negotiation between the different responsible
jurisdictional levels, and negotiation between the
demand side and the commercial wetland
entrepreneur. This implies a complex negotiations
process. The challenge is to structure this process,
and to include all the responsible jurisdictional
levels (scale 5) in the complex negotiation process.
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CONCLUSIONS
To facilitate the socially optimal provision of
ecosystem services provided by commercial
wetlands, we developed a framework to link
ecosystem services with public and private decision
making. This Eco² governance framework
combines the private investment in commercial
wetland decisions with the social value of the
produced services. Possible economic governance
systems can be proposed to give incentives for
private investments in these wetlands. However, a
number of challenges have to be addressed before
investments in commercial wetlands can be
profitable. These challenges are analyzed using the
observation that the five elements in the Eco²
governance framework are measured in different
scales, and that within these scales different levels
are found.
From the application of the framework in a pilot
study in the eastern part of the Netherlands, it
followed that the expansion of the concept to a
national level will currently be almost impossible.
This is due to the mismatch between the scales
related to the provided ecosystem services, the
demand of the wetland services, and the
jurisdictional scale. If commercial wetlands are
optimal from social planners’ point of view, they
can hardly be implemented privately. This goes
beyond the fact that many of the services are public
goods. To match these ecosystem services and to
enable the implementation of commercial wetlands,
institutional solutions need to fit different services.
Given that property rights to private wetlands
remain distinct and autonomous, the governance
choice can be (1) just exchanging information, (2)
a new jurisdictional level responsible for all types
of wetland services, or (3) an intermediary private
organization that coordinates on behalf of
entrepreneurs. The first option will be weak in
coordinating supply and demand. Changing
jurisdictional responsibilities only for implementation
of commercial wetlands will involve relatively high
transaction costs. Despite which governance
approach will be implemented, developing
economic governance solutions will help to arrange
an optimal allocation of commercial wetlands. The
framework developed in this paper can support this
process in a structured way by combining
commercial wetlands, ecosystem services, and
governance.
Responses to this article can be read online at:
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol16/iss1/art33/
responses/
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